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Abstract 
Multisourcing—the delegation of interdependent tasks to multiple vendors—is receiving increasing 
attention in practice and in research. Yet, we know little about the circumstances under which organi-
zations choose multisourcing. In this paper, we draw on incomplete contracting theory and the 
knowledge-based view to explain multisourcing decisions in application projects. We test our model 
using a comprehensive dataset of 1093 sourcing decisions made by Swiss public organizations. The 
results provide strong support for the model. We find that clients choose multisourcing more frequent-
ly when (1) the project is large, (2) the software is client-specific and the project is large enough, (3) 
client and vendor lack joint experience, (4) the client seeks knowledge, (5) the technology is not pro-
prietary, and (6) the client is experienced in outsourcing. While these findings support common views 
that clients choose multisourcing in response to opportunistic threats and to knowledge needs, the 
findings also shed light on prerequisites for multisourcing. 
 
Keywords: Multisourcing, Multisourcing decision, Incomplete contracting theory, Property rights the-
ory, Transaction cost economics, Knowledge-based view, Sourcing decision, asset specificity. 
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1 Introduction 
When the Swiss Post aimed to replace the software that supported their 30,000 letter carriers in their 
daily work, they did not contract one vendor to develop a new, state-of-the-art software; they contract-
ed six. The Swiss Post assigned a number of work packages to each vendor and promised them further 
work packages if they demonstrated their ability to deliver. The multi-million dollar project was high-
ly successful, being completed 6 months ahead of plans (Hurni et al. 2015; Tomczak 2015). 
The Swiss Post project is an example of information systems (IS) multisourcing, i.e., the delegation of 
interdependent IS services to two or more vendors (Bapna et al. 2010; Wiener and Saunders 2014). 
Multisourcing is not the same as contracting multiple vendors (or multi-vendor outsourcing) (Currie 
and Willcocks 1998; Koo et al. 2016). Multisourcing denotes the more specific situation where a client 
assigns interdependent tasks to multiple vendors, forcing vendors to collaborate (Bapna et al. 2010; 
Wiener and Saunders 2014). For instance, the Swiss Post assigned work packages within the same 
software project to multiple vendors, forcing the vendors to jointly develop a coherent system. 
IS multisourcing is attracting increasing interest in practice and in research. According to data collect-
ed by IDC, the global IS multisourcing business increased from less than $1 billion in 2001 to more 
than $7 billion in 2007 (Bapna et al. 2010, p. 787). Researchers have called multisourcing “the leading 
edge of modern organizational forms” (Bapna et al. 2010, p. 785), and begun to explore benefits and 
challenges associated with multisourcing. One benefit is that multisourcing allows clients to engender 
post-contractual competition, mitigating the dependence on a single vendor (Levina and Su 2008, p. 
561). For instance, as the project progressed, the Swiss Post dynamically assigned work packages to 
vendors based on their performance, extending competition beyond contract settlement. This contrasts 
with single-sourcing (i.e., delegating all interdependent tasks to one vendor), where competition often 
vanishes after contract settlement given that only one vendor acquires the project-specific knowledge 
and, hence, is able to carry out subsequent work (Williamson 1981). A second benefit from multi-
sourcing is access to the knowledge of best-of-breed vendors (Bapna et al. 2010). These two benefits 
come at the cost of two important challenges. First, vendors may have lower incentives to make client-
specific investments, in particular if a client “slices the pie too thinly” (Levina and Su 2008, p. 545). 
Second, clients face the difficult mission of managing multiple vendors. They may need strong 
knowledge to orchestrate the contributions of the individual vendors (Brusoni et al. 2001) and to make 
individual vendors accountable for their omissions (Bapna et al. 2010). 
Although these insights provided by the multisourcing literature are valuable, our understanding of 
multisourcing decisions remains limited. We lack theory-based explanations for multisourcing deci-
sions and empirical evidence that shows under which conditions clients choose multisourcing. Yet, 
theoretically and empirically substantiated knowledge about multisourcing decisions would be valua-
ble for two reasons. First, in line with assumptions in the institutional economics and the strategy liter-
atures, we believe that by studying decisions for alternative organizing forms (e.g., firm versus market, 
multisourcing versus single-sourcing), scholars can gain insights into more the more fundamental 
question of why these organizing forms exist and, hence, what they serve for (Coase 1937; Poppo and 
Zenger 1998; Williamson 1981). Second, such knowledge would be practically relevant for clients in 
their mission of balancing the benefits and challenges of multisourcing in particular projects. 
In this paper, we address these gaps in the context of application projects. Application projects (i.e., 
application development or maintenance projects) typically require intensive coordination among in-
volved parties (Kraut and Streeter 1995), which aligns well with the multisourcing characteristic of 
interdependent tasks. Moreover, application projects vary strongly in the degree to which client-
specific knowledge is required (Dibbern et al. 2008), promising insights into issues related to specific 
knowledge and vendor dependence. Our research question is: Under which conditions do organiza-
tions choose multisourcing, as opposed to single-sourcing, for application projects? 
We address this question by developing hypotheses based on incomplete contracting theory and the 
knowledge-based view. We test these hypotheses on a large dataset of 1093 sourcing decisions. Our 
key contribution is to show that both theories explain unique variance in multisourcing decisions. 
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2 Theory and Hypotheses 
In this paper, we aim to explain multisourcing decisions by drawing on incomplete contracting theory, 
which encompasses both transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson 1981) and property rights 
theory (PRT) (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Hart and Moore 1990), and on the knowledge-based view 
(KBV) (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Hodgson 1998). 
We choose these theories because they provide explanations that resonate with thinking and with find-
ings in existing multisourcing research. TCE provides the key idea that, in single-sourcing, opportunis-
tic threats arise, under certain conditions, from the client’s dependence on a single vendor (Williamson 
1981). Since multisourcing helps reduce the dependence on a single vendor (Levina and Su 2008, p. 
561), it may help safeguard against the opportunistic threats that arise from such dependence. PRT 
offers the idea that when a party shares residual rents with other parties, the party’s motivation to 
make relationship-specific investments drops (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Hart and Moore 1990). 
This resonates with the finding that, in multisourcing, vendors may hesitate to invest unless the busi-
ness perspective for vendors is significant (Levina and Su 2008, p. 545; Wiener and Saunders 2014, p. 
220). The KBV holds that differences in knowledge between organizations are often irreducible 
(Conner and Prahalad 1996; Hodgson 1998). Irreducible knowledge differences help explain why cli-
ents choose multisourcing to access best-of-breed knowledge (Bapna et al. 2010). Table 1 provides an 
overview of these theories, including their key assumptions, their explanations for multisourcing deci-
sions, and the ensuing predictions. Figure 1 shows our theoretical model with hypotheses. 
 
Theory Key As-sumptions Key Explanations for Multisourcing Decisions 
Predictions: Multi-
sourcing is more fre-
quent when … 
Incomplete con-
tracting theory 
(Hart and 
Moore 1990; 
Williamson 
1981) 
Bounded 
rationality, 
opportun-
ism 
Function of multisourcing: Multisourcing helps 
safeguard against opportunistic threats by engen-
dering post-contractual competition (TCE). 
… opportunistic threats 
are high (H1-H3). 
Prerequisite for multisourcing: Expected residual 
rents need to be high enough for vendors to make 
investments into client-specific assets (PRT). 
… projects are large 
enough to warrant in-
vestment (H4-H5). 
Knowledge-
based View 
(Conner and 
Prahalad 1996) 
Irreducible 
knowledge 
differences 
Function of multisourcing: Multisourcing enables 
access to knowledge. 
… client seeks 
knowledge (H6). 
Prerequisite for multisourcing: Multiple vendors 
possess relevant knowledge. 
… technology is not 
proprietary (H7). 
Prerequisite for multisourcing: Clients possess 
sufficient knowledge to manage multiple vendors.  
… client is experienced 
in outsourcing (H8). 
Table 1. Theory Overview 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
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2.1 Incomplete Contracting Theory 
In line with Kim and Mahoney (2005), we subsume TCE and PRT under the umbrella of incomplete 
contracting theory. Both theories rely on the key assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism 
(Grossman and Hart 1986). Bounded rationality means that actors are intendedly rational but only lim-
itedly so because of human cognitive limitations (Simon 1957; Williamson 1981, p. 553). Specifically, 
clients are unable to fully anticipate all possible future states of the world, which results in incomplete 
contracts (Hart and Moore 1990, p. 1120; Williamson 1979, p. 238). Incomplete contracts due to 
bounded rationality are a reality in application projects, where clients are typically unable to fully an-
ticipate requirements at the outset of projects (Wallace et al. 2004; Walz et al. 1993). Opportunism is 
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson 1979, p. 234). Vendors are opportunistic, for instance, 
when they shirk, lie, of hold up clients to maximize own gains. While both theories share these as-
sumptions, TCE emphasizes the perspective of the client whereas PRT incorporates the perspective of 
the vendor, in particular the issue of how the distribution of residual rents affects the vendor’s motiva-
tion to invest (Kim and Mahoney 2005, p. 231). Thus the theories are complementary (Kim and 
Mahoney 2005). We next develop hypotheses for multisourcing decisions based on TCE before we 
complement them with ideas from PRT. 
2.1.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
According to TCE, bounded rationality and opportunism are relatively unproblematic as long as there 
is competition between vendors. When a client can select from a market with many equivalent ven-
dors, the client can respond to opportunistic vendor behavior by switching to another vendor 
(Williamson 1979, p. 248). Conversely, bounded rationality and opportunism become problematic 
when competition vanishes, or markets fail. Competition vanishes when asset specificity is high, i.e., 
when vendors are required to invest into assets (including knowledge) that lose most of their value 
when they are redeployed to other clients (Williamson 1981). Under high asset specificity, clients be-
come dependent on the vendor that possesses client-specific assets. For instance, when a project re-
quires deep knowledge in a client-specific software system (high asset specificity), a vendor that pos-
sesses such knowledge may hold up the client, such as by charging higher fees after contract changes, 
being aware that client is hardly able to obtain the service from an alternative vendor. Clients antici-
pate these opportunistic threats and choose organizing forms depending on opportunistic threats. Some 
organizing forms are held to be more effective for discouraging opportunism than others. 
There is some evidence that multisourcing is more effective for discouraging opportunism than single-
sourcing. Multisourcing helps discourage opportunism by extending the competition between vendors 
to the period after initial contracts are signed. Empirical evidence describes vendors in multisourcing 
settings as highly cooperative because of this competition-enhancing effect (Levina and Su 2008, p. 
561; Wiener and Saunders 2014). When vendors behave opportunistically, multisourcing clients can 
credibly threaten to award future work to another vendor because multiple vendors have been engaged 
in the project, have acquired project-specific knowledge, and, hence, would be able to provide the ser-
vice. A similar point was made in a case study by Wiener and Saunders (2014), who observed that 
“the overlap in vendor skills and areas led to intense competition among vendors and reduced [the cli-
ent’s] dependency on a single vendor” (p. 218). In sum, an important function of multisourcing from 
the perspective of TCE is to help safeguard against opportunistic threats by engendering post-
contractual competition. Clients, hence, choose multisourcing in those settings where opportunistic 
threats are particularly high (see also the second line in Table 1). 
The key driver of opportunistic threats according to TCE is asset specificity (Williamson 1981, p. 
555). Asset specificity refers to the degree to which an asset loses its value when it is redeployed to its 
second best use. While Williamson introduced several dimensions of asset specificity, in “IT outsourc-
ing, the most likely specific asset is human, more precisely, employee knowledge” (Aubert and Rivard 
2016, p. 65). IS outsourcing research has thus focused on knowledge specificity (or human asset speci-
ficity), i.e., the degree to which knowledge loses its value when it is redeployed to its second best use 
(Dibbern et al. 2016). Knowledge specificity causes two types of opportunistic threats: underinvest-
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ment and hold-up. High knowledge specificity may lead to underinvestment because projects of high 
knowledge specificity require vendors to make costly investments into “[s]pecialized training and 
learning-by-doing” (Williamson 1979, p. 240). Opportunistic vendors may be reluctant to make these 
investments given that they cannot leverage these investments in their business with other clients. A 
second opportunistic threat is that client may be held up during contract renegotiations because once 
the vendor has made investments into client-specific knowledge, the client will not find alternative 
vendors with similar client-specific knowledge on the market. Vendors may then exploit this depend-
ence and influence contract adjustments or renewal to their advantage, such as by charging higher 
prices. Multisourcing can help counteract both threats. If clients observe underinvestment by a vendor, 
multisourcing allows them to threaten to delegate portions of work to other vendors. In a similar vein, 
with multisourcing, vendors may be in a weaker position to hold up clients because clients can choose 
among several of their existing vendors, which may all have acquired client-specific knowledge during 
the collaboration. Foresighted clients anticipate the opportunistic threats that result of high knowledge 
specificity and choose multisourcing to mitigate them. 
An important issue for testing is these ideas is how knowledge specificity manifests in application pro-
jects. Software development research (Banker et al. 1993; Banker et al. 2002; Boh et al. 2007) and 
outsourcing research (Chua and Pan 2008; Krancher and Dibbern 2015) concur that a key type of 
knowledge in application projects is application knowledge, i.e., knowledge about the application 
software that is developed or maintained. Engineers often require long experience in a particular 
software before their cognitive schemas of the software are sufficiently powerful to allow them to ef-
fectively configure or maintain it (Krancher and Dibbern 2012; Von Mayrhauser and Vans 1995). The 
extent to which application knowledge is client specific depends on the nature of the software. When 
the software is client specific (i.e., custom-developed), vendor engineers cannot reuse their cognitive 
schemas (or knowledge) of the software across projects because, per definition, no other instance of 
the same software exists. Conversely, when the software is not client-specific (i.e., packaged soft-
ware), vendor engineers can apply the same application knowledge (e.g. knowledge about SAP) for 
many clients. Thus, opportunistic threats are lower in packaged software, where the market offers al-
ternative vendors with largely equivalent application knowledge (e.g. knowledge about SAP), than in 
custom-developed software projects, where the market does not offer alternative vendors with applica-
tion knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the particular custom-developed software). Clients anticipate 
the opportunistic threats associated with client-specific software and choose multisourcing to extend 
competition beyond contract settlement and thus to safeguard against opportunism. We hypothesize: 
H1: The likelihood of multisourcing is higher when the software is client specific. 
A second important driver of opportunistic threats according to TCE is uncertainty. Although TCE 
researchers distinguish several types of uncertainty (Schermann et al. 2016), Williamson emphasizes 
behavioral uncertainty, or “[u]ncertainty of a strategic kind [that] is attributable to opportunism” 
(Williamson 1984, p. 205). Behavioral uncertainty refers thus to the likelihood that transaction part-
ners behave opportunistically. Outsourcing research has often measured behavioral uncertainty based 
on prior joint experience (Benaroch et al. 2016, p. 69; Corts and Singh 2004, p. 232; Dekker and Van 
den Abbeele 2010, p. 1234; Gefen et al. 2008, p. 531). The argument is that when clients do business 
with the same vendor again, this indicates that the client has developed trust in the integrity and ability 
of the vendor during the prior project, or the client would not have chosen the same vendor again. Pri-
or joint experience thus indicates lower behavioral uncertainty and, hence, lower opportunistic threats. 
Since clients choose multisourcing when opportunistic threats are high, we expect multisourcing to be 
more frequent when clients and vendors lack prior joint experience: 
H2: The likelihood of multisourcing is higher when clients and vendors lack prior joint experience. 
According to TCE, knowledge specificity and behavioral uncertainty should not be considered in iso-
lation; it is their interplay that affects decisions for organizing forms (Williamson 1985, p. 59). If a 
client fully trusts a vendor (i.e., if behavioral uncertainty is absent), the client has no reason to fear 
underinvestment or hold-up, even if knowledge specificity is high. In a similar vein, if vendors do not 
have to make client-specific investments into knowledge (i.e., if knowledge specificity is very low), 
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the client may not fear vendor opportunism because the vendor could easily be replaced by a competi-
tor. We thus expect the following interaction of client-specific software and prior experience: 
H3: Joint prior experience weakens the positive relationship between client-specific software and mul-
tisourcing. 
2.1.2 Property Rights Theory 
While PRT shares key assumptions with TCE, it complements TCE by focussing on the conditions 
that affect the vendor’s motivation to make client-specific investments. Like TCE, PRT assumes that 
bounded rationality prevents opportunistic parties from stipulating complete contracts. The basic ar-
gument of PRT is that, under incomplete contracts, vendors have stronger incentives to make client-
specific investments when their residual rights and their expected residual rents are substantial. Resid-
ual rights are those rights to use, earn income from, and exchange a resource that a party does not give 
away through the contract (Richmond et al. 1992). Residual rents are the benefits from the collabora-
tion that are not distributed ex ante through the incomplete contract (Hart and Moore 1990). 
To illustrate the applicability of these concepts, consider a vendor that faces the decision of whether to 
allocate its best engineers to a new single-sourcing project. If the vendor assigned its best engineers to 
the project, the engineers would spend some months to acquire client-specific knowledge. After that, 
they would be able to combine their superior pre-existing knowledge with the newly acquired client-
specific knowledge to make superior design decisions in the project. The superior design decisions 
could result in substantial cost savings and in follow-up contracts with the highly satisfied client. The 
decision to allocate its best engineers to this project is rational for the vendor if the vendor can expect 
to reap a large portion of these benefits. How does this situation change if the project is a multisourc-
ing project? PRT points to two important changes. First, multisourcing curtails the vendor’s residual 
rights related to the key resource, its engineers’ knowledge. Whereas in single-sourcing the vendor can 
leverage this knowledge to independently make superior design decisions, in multisourcing the vendor 
would need to make many design decisions jointly with other vendors, given that the vendors’ tasks 
are interdependent. Other vendors that eschewed investments and, hence, lack the superior knowledge 
of our focal vendor may disagree with the suggested designs and convince the client of an alternative, 
less effective design. The vendor is thus unable to generate rents from the investments. Second, even if 
the other vendors recognize the superior knowledge of our focal vendor and let the vendor make key 
design decisions, it is uncertain whether our focal vendor will the reap the rents caused by the superior 
design decisions. Given low verifiability of results in application projects (Ravindran 2012) and team 
production due to multisourcing (i.e., production by a team of interdependent vendors) (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972), other vendors may claim to be accountable for the superior performance and attempt 
to reap the rents. For instance, the other vendors may save costs by allocating junior engineers, given 
that the overall project is ahead of plans, or they may falsely claim to be responsible for the superior 
project performance and attempt to win follow-up contracts. Hence, low verifiability paired with in-
terdependence in multisourcing curtail the residual rents that our focal vendor can reap from own in-
vestments. 
While these arguments suggest that multisourcing generally reduces the vendor’s motivation to invest, 
they also points to conditions under which vendors may be willing to make substantial investments 
despite multisourcing. If a project is very large, the residual rents that each vendor can gain may still 
be substantial enough to warrant client-specific investments. In a very large project, it is more likely 
that there are large chunks of work in which vendors can make decisions relatively autonomously and, 
hence, more credibly claim to be accountable for the results. Moreover, due to scale effects, it will 
generally be easier to amortize investments in large projects such that substantial residual rents are 
possible even in the presence of multiple vendors. This is in line with findings in multisourcing re-
search according to which clients need to promise a substantial business perspective to vendors in or-
der to motivate them to make investments (Levina and Su 2008, p. 545; Wiener and Saunders 2014, p. 
220). In light of this positive relationship between residual rents and project size, we expect: 
H4: The likelihood of multisourcing increases with project size 
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PRT suggests that the effect of knowledge specificity on multisourcing decisions may be more com-
plex than suggested in our arguments derived from TCE. Although the enhanced competition generat-
ed through multisourcing may help force vendors to make client-specific investments, the uncertain 
distribution of residual rents with multisourcing may also make vendors more reluctant to make client-
specific investments. Which of these two effects dominates will likely depend on project size. In large 
projects, client-specific investments may still pay off for vendors, and enhanced competition through 
multisourcing may further enhance vendor commitment. Conversely, in small projects, client-specific 
investments may not pay off for vendors, and the prospect of competing with other vendors after con-
tract settlement may make investments for the vendor even less attractive. We expect: 
H5: The relationship between client-specific software and multisourcing depends on project size. The 
relationship is positive for large projects and negative for small projects. 
2.2 Knowledge-based View 
The KBV (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Grant 1996; Hodgson 1998; Kogut and Zander 1996) differs 
from incomplete contracting theories in a key assumption related to knowledge acquisition. While in-
complete contracting theory assumes that knowledge acquisition is possible but more costly in some 
settings than in others, the KBV assumes that knowledge acquisition is often impossible within rea-
sonable time. Thus knowledge differences between firms are often irreducible (Conner and Prahalad 
1996). The knowledge of a firm is a resource that is not easily replicated by another firm because of 
cognitive (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Conner and Prahalad 1996) and social (Hodgson 1998; Kogut 
and Zander 1996; Zimmermann et al. in press) challenges associated knowledge acquisition. 
Irreducible knowledge differences affect multisourcing decisions in three important ways. First, a fre-
quent argument in the multisourcing literature is that clients choose multisourcing to work with best-
of-breed vendors, i.e., to access the knowledge of specialized vendors (Bapna et al. 2010; Su and 
Levina 2011; Wiener and Saunders 2014). The implicit assumption in this argument is that differences 
in knowledge between vendors are irreducible. If knowledge differences are irreducible, then those 
clients that seek access to knowledge through outsourcing may prefer multisourcing because the 
chance that multiple vendors collectively possess the required knowledge are higher than the chance 
that one vendor possesses the knowledge. This suggests: 
H6: The likelihood of multisourcing is higher in projects in which clients seek knowledge. 
Although clients may choose multisourcing to gain access to knowledge, a prerequisite for this strate-
gy is that multiple vendors need to possess the knowledge that is most relevant to the project. This pre-
requisite may not always be given. Some projects may rely on proprietary technology, i.e., technology 
owned by one of the vendors (Argyres et al. 2007, p. 11). In such a case, there may be only one vendor 
who is intimately familiar with the technology and, hence, is able to deliver the project. For instance, 
in one project in our dataset, the veterinary department of the university hospital Zurich contracted the 
small software firm GP.Software to implement a packaged laboratory information system that is suited 
to the demands of veterinary healthcare. GP.Software was not only the implementor at the university 
hospital but also the owner of the software package (i.e., GP.Sofware has developed and sells the 
software package). Given GP.Software’s unique knowledge resulting from the developing the soft-
ware package and from implementing their own package at many clients, it would have been difficult 
for the university hospital to find other vendors with similar project-relevant knowledge. We expect: 
H7: The likelihood of multisourcing is lower when technology is proprietary. 
A third mechanism of how irreducible knowledge differences affect multisourcing decisions regards 
the knowledge of the client. The literature on product development multisourcing shows that multi-
sourcing requires substantial knowledge from clients (Brusoni et al. 2001; Takeishi 2002). Brusoni 
and colleagues found that aircraft engine manufacturers made strong efforts to acquire and retain 
knowledge even in domains related to those products that were developed by external vendors. This 
knowledge was essential to integrate the services delivered by different vendors. Indeed, clients may 
need strong management capabilities to cope with the challenges of multisourcing, which include: de-
vising effective services level agreements for multiple suppliers, setting up coordination mechanisms 
Krancher et al. /Multisourcing Decisions in Application Outsourcing 
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth,UK, 2018 8 
 
that help cope with task and knowledge interdependence across multiple organizational boundaries, 
motivating competing vendors to help each other, and diagnosing and attributing finger-point behavior 
due to accountability problems (Bapna et al. 2010; Wiener and Saunders 2014). Clients who lack ex-
perience with managing IS outsourcing projects may lack the capabilities required to cope with these 
challenges. We therefore hypothesize: 
H8: The likelihood of multisourcing is higher when clients have high IS outsourcing experience. 
3 Methods 
3.1 Dataset 
We tested our theoretical model on a comprehensive dataset of 1093 application projects that 229 pub-
lic Swiss organizations awarded between 2013 and February 2017. We extracted the data from the 
simap database (http://www.simap.ch), a public procurement platform for Swiss public administra-
tions and publicly held companies. In Switzerland, all federal organizations and most cantonal and 
local administrations are legally required to publish bid invitations and contract awards of projects that 
exceed a value of 250,000 Swiss Francs (CHF) (about 250,000 USD) on the simap platform, although 
they may also publish smaller projects. The platform has been in operation since 2008. 
We used the simap database because it offered a number of advantages. First, selection bias was lower 
than in survey designs given that publishing transactions on the simap database is mandatory. Second, 
since the database has been in operation since 2008, the database provided objective data related to the 
client’s prior IS outsourcing experience and prior joint experience of client and vendor. Third, the da-
tabase allowed us to draw a random sample of 1093 application projects, out of which 972 were sin-
gle-sourcing and 121 were multisourcing projects. Analyzing multisourcing decisions requires such a 
relatively large sample size because our dichotomous dependent variable (multisourcing versus single-
sourcing) calls for logistic regression approaches and logistic regression requires 10 observations per 
group and per estimated parameter (Hair et al. 2010, p. 318). Our data include 121 observations in the 
multisourcing group, which is slightly above the 110 observations required for estimating the 11 pa-
rameters of our model. 
3.2 Extraction and Coding Process 
We used a crawler to extract data from the simap database. The data was then subject to an extensive 
data cleansing process, the details of which are omitted here due to space constraints (but are available 
on request from the authors). Two coders then coded each project based on a detailed coding scheme 
(available on request from the authors). The coders were blind to the hypotheses of the study. After 
being trained on sample data, they started independent coding only once the agreement between a cod-
er and the first author in the sample data exceeded 85%. 
3.3 Variables 
Table 1 shows how we measured the variables of our theoretical model. The variables include multi-
sourcing, the predictors of our theoretical model and three control variables: client size, vendor size, 
and the application phase. The variables multisourcing, client size, vendor size, prior joint experience, 
project size, and IS outsourcing experience were automatically extracted from the database. The varia-
bles client-specific software, proprietary technology, application phase, knowledge sought were coded 
according to the coding procedure mentioned above. Information on whether clients sougth knowledge 
was available only for the projects that were awarded through public tendering (n = 562). 
Our operationalization of multisourcing as awarding services within one project to multiple vendors in 
line with our definition, which reserves multisourcing to interdependent subtasks are awarded to mul-
tiple vendors. The simap database showed whether a particular project was awarded to one or more 
vendors. Examples of projects included the implementation of a clinical software package, require-
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ments analysis for a new tax management system, or integrating a set of regional traffic control appli-
cations. When one such projects was awarded to more than one vendor, the subtasks of these vendors 
would be interdependent because the vendors had to collaborate within a common project. 
 
Variable Description Measurement Ap-proach 
Multisourcing 1 if the project was awarded to more than one vendor; 
else 0 
Automatically extract-
ed from the database 
Client Size Total volume in CHF of projects awarded by the client 
on the simap platform (natural logarithm) 
Automatically extract-
ed from the database 
Vendor Size Total volume in CHF of projects awarded to the vendor 
on the simap platform (natural logarithm); in case of 
multiple vendors: average of all vendors  
Automatically extract-
ed from the database 
Application Phase: 
Maintenance 
1 if the project started during the maintenance phase 
(i.e., the software was live at that client); else 0 
Coded based on the 
project descriptions 
Client-specific Soft-
ware 
1 if the project involved custom-developed software; 
else 0 
Coded based on the 
project descriptions 
Proprietary technol-
ogy 
1 if the project involved a software package developed 
by the vendor; else 0 
Coded based on the 
project descriptions 
Prior Joint Experi-
ence 
1 if the client had previously awarded a contract to the 
same vendor; else 0; in case of multiple vendors: aver-
age of 0/1 values 
Automatically extract-
ed from the database 
Project Size Project volume in CHF (natural logarithm) Automatically extract-
ed from the database 
IS Outsourcing Ex-
perience 
The number of IS projects that the client had awarded 
on the simap platform before (natural logarithm) 
Automatically extract-
ed from the database 
Knowledge Sought 1 if the need for in knowledge in a particular domain 
was mentioned in the bid invitation; else 0 
Coded based on project 
descriptions 
Table 2. Variable Description and Measurement 
3.4 Regression Approach 
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable, we used logistic regression. Although our 
data were nested at two levels, with multisourcing decisions being nested within clients, the intraclass 
correlation coefficient was 0.2%, suggesting that decisions made by the same client hardly correlated 
with each other. Hence, we refrained from using multi-level regression strategies such as generalized 
linear mixed models, although we verified that these strategies yielded very similar results. Following 
a hierarchical regression strategy, we first estimated models that included main effects only and then 
included interaction effects in a second model. Moreover, we separately estimated models using the 
subsample of projects with public tendering, where information about knowledge sought was availa-
ble, and in the whole sample, where we excluded the knowledge sought as a predictor. 
4 Results 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics per subsample and bi-variate correlations. Table 4 shows the re-
gression results. Models 1a and 2a include main effects only, whereas models 1b and 2b also include 
interaction effects. Models 1a and 1b refer to the full sample, while models 2a and 2b refer to the sub-
sample of projects with public tendering. We refer to model 1a in examining main effects, with the 
exception of H7, which we examine using model 2a because information on knowledge sought was 
available only in public tendering projects. We refer to model 1b in testing interaction effects. 
 
Krancher et al. /Multisourcing Decisions in Application Outsourcing 
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth,UK, 2018 10 
 
 Single-
Sourcing: 
Mean(SD) 
Multi-
sourcing: 
Mean(SD) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Multisourc. - - 1          
(2) Client Size 286m(607m) 674m(943m) .15 1         
(3) Vendor Size 167m(1.2 bn) 138m(487m) .18 .23 1        
(4) Maintenance .51(.50) .45(.50) -.04 .19 .14 1       
(5) Client-sp. Sw .35(.48) .51(.50) .11 .17 .12 .13 1      
(6) Propr. Tech. .40(.49) .04(.20) -.23 -.10 -.13 -.10 -.54 1     
(7) Prior Jt. Exp. .31(.46) .27(.32) -.03 .36 .38 .27 .17 -.06 1    
(8) Project Size 3m(13m) 24m(46m) .44 .31 .47 -.10 .11 -.13 .09 1   
(9) IS Outs. Exp. 31(38) 44(47) .11 .74 .11 .24 .19 -.13 .42 .08 1  
(10) Gen. Know. .38(.49) .75(.44) .29 .27 .26 .20 .32 -.24 .17 .36 .21 1 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Bi-variate Correlations 
 
Variable Model 1a (main 
effects, full sam-
ple) 
Model 1b (main 
and interaction 
effects, full 
sample) 
Model 2a (main 
effects, public 
tendering sub-
sample) 
Model 2b (main 
and interaction 
effects, public 
tend. subsample) 
Constant -13.74 (1.67) -10.74 (1.91) -11.64 (1.86) -8.28 (2.14) 
Client Size -0.19 (0.10) -0.17 (0.1) -0.20 (0.12) -0.20 (0.12) 
Vendor Size 0.05 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) 0.01 (0.08) 0.00 (0.08) 
Phase: Maintenance -0.01 (0.24) 0.1 (0.25) 0.71* (0.29) 0.83** (0.29) 
Client-specific Software -0.33 (0.25) -7.89** (2.8) 0.00 (0.29) -7.73* (3.24) 
Prior Joint Experience -1.21*** (0.34) -1.14* (0.46) -1.19** (0.43) -0.57 (0.57) 
Project Size 0.97*** (0.11) 0.74*** (0.13) 0.84*** (0.13) 0.61*** (0.16) 
Knowledge Sought - - 0.73* (0.30) 0.80** (0.30) 
Proprietary Technology -2.83*** (0.51) -2.67*** (0.49) -3.02*** (0.78) -2.74*** (0.77) 
IS Outsourcing Experience 0.41** (0.13) 0.39** (0.13) 0.44** (0.15) 0.45** (0.15) 
Client-spec. × Prior Joint Exp. - -0.11 (0.61) - -1.19 (0.77) 
Client-spec. × Project Size - 0.51** (0.19)  0.54* (0.22) 
Sample Size 1093 1093 562 562 
Chi2 Delta (df) 261.40*** (8) 7.88* (2) 196.15*** (9) 7.49* (2) 
Fraction of Correct Predictions 91.2% 91.5% 86.8% 87.2% 
Nagelkerke R2 .42 .44 .47 .48 
*** p <.001, ** p <.01, * p <.05, figures are beta regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses), signifi-
cances indicate the results of Wald tests, significant number in bold 
Table 4. Logistic Regression Results 
The hypothesis deduced from incomplete contracting theory earned substantial support, although the 
support for TCE was weaker than for PRT. We begin with the three hypotheses derived from TCE. H1 
predicted multisourcing to be more frequent in projects that involve client-specific software. Yet, the 
relationship was not significant (β = -.33, p >.05, model 1a), providing no support for H1. H2 predict-
ed multisourcing to be more frequent when clients and vendors lack prior joint experience. The results 
support the hypothesis (β = -1.21, p <.001, model 1a). The regression coefficient implies that the odds 
for multisourcing decreased by substantial 70% (= 100%-exp(-1.21)) when clients and vendors had 
prior joint experience. H3 predicted a negative interaction effect between client-specific software and 
prior joint experience. This interaction effect was not significant (β = -.11, p >.05, model 1b), provid-
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ing no support for H3. The two hypotheses derived from PRT earned strong support. H4 predicted a 
positive relationship between project size and multisourcing. The relationship was positive and strong 
(β =.97, p <.001, model 1a). H5 predicted a positive interaction effect of client-specific knowledge and 
project size on multisourcing. The results provide strong support for such an interaction effect (β =.51, 
p <.01, model 1b). The interaction plots shown in Figure 2 provide an intuition of these results. As the 
plots show, the probability of multisourcing was relatively low for small projects, with probabilities 
being marginally lower for projects that involved client-specific software. Conversely, the probability 
for multisourcing increased strongly for large projects, in particular if the software was client specific. 
For instance, projects of a size of 50 million Swiss Francs (or about 50 million USD) were multi-
sourced with a probability of 73% if the software was client specific and of 46% if the software was 
not client specific. The intersection point of the two graphs was at 5.2 million Francs. That is, for pro-
jects larger than 5.2 million Francs, the probability of multisourcing was higher when the software was 
client specific. 
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Figure 2. Interaction Plot: Project Size and Client-specific Software 
The results support the three hypotheses derived from the KBV. As expected in H6, clients were more 
likely to choose multisourcing when they sought knowledge through the outsourcing project (β =.73, p 
<.05, model 2a). The coefficient implies that the odds for mulitsourcing more than doubled when cli-
ents sought knowledge. As predicted in H7, multisourcing was less frequent when the technology was 
proprietary (β = -2.83, p <.001, model 1a). The odds for multisourcing dropped by dramatic 94% when 
technology was proprietary. Moreover, in line with H8, we found that clients were more likely to 
choose multisourcing when they had large IS outsourcing experience (β = .41, p <.01, model 1a). 
As the Nagelkerke R2 value of .44 and the fraction of correct predictions of 91.5% (model 1b) show, 
our model had strong fit with the data, supporting the validity of our empirical specification. 
5 Discussion 
Although interest in multisourcing is strongly increasing among IS outsourcing practitioners and 
scholars, theoretical explanations for multisourcing decisions are in a nascent stage, and empirical evi-
dence about multisourcing decisions is difficult to find. In this paper, we develop a model based on 
incomplete contracting theory (including TCE and PRT) and the KBV to explain multisourcing deci-
sion, and we provide an empirical test of this model based on a large dataset of sourcing decisions. 
5.1 Incomplete Contracting Theory and Multisourcing Decisions 
Our results show that, in tandem, the incomplete contracting theories TCE and PRT explain multi-
sourcing decisions well. The basic argument derived from TCE is that multisourcing allows clients to 
combat opportunistic threats by extending competition beyond the contract settlement and that clients 
therefore choose multisourcing when opportunistic threats are high. Our analysis focused on two driv-
ers of opportunistic threats: knowledge specificity, as empirically indicated by client-specific software, 
and behavioral uncertainty, as empirically indicated by the lack of prior joint experience. Although we 
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did not find support for an unconditional effect of knowledge specificity on multisourcing decisions 
(see our results on H1), our results showed that, in large projects, knowledge specificity augmented the 
likelihood of multisourcing (see our results on H5 and the interaction plots shown in Figure 2). More-
over, in line with TCE reasoning, clients chose multisourcing more frequently when behavioral uncer-
tainty (as indicated by the lack of prior joint experience) was high (see our results on H2). By and 
large, these results support the TCE-based idea that clients choose multisourcing when opportunistic 
threats are high. The observation that multisourcing is chosen to mitigate opportunistic threats also 
resonates with multisourcing research that described vendors in multisourcing relationships as highly 
committed (or little opportunistic), given constant competition in the project (Levina and Su 2008, p. 
561; Wiener and Saunders 2014). 
Although our results broadly support the idea that opportunistic threats explain multisourcing deci-
sions, there are two important qualifications. First, clients appear to respond to high knowledge speci-
ficity through multisourcing only if projects are reasonably large (see our results on H5 and Figure 2). 
This pattern is well predicted by PRT, which argues that projects need to be large enough to motivate 
vendors to make client-specific investments despite uncertain residual rents. Hence, PRT is a useful 
extension of TCE in the context of multisourcing decisions. Although IS multisourcing research has 
not drawn on PRT, our findings related to PRT are consistent with the empirical observation that mul-
tisourcing clients need to make strong efforts to demonstrate the potential for future business to ven-
dors (Su and Levina 2011; Wiener and Saunders 2014). A second qualification is that although behav-
ioral uncertainty matters only in conjunction with knowledge specificity according to TCE, we did not 
find support for an interaction effect (see our results on H3). Possibly, even if the software is not client 
specific, application projects may still be of at least moderate knowledge specificity, given that clients 
need to acquire idiosyncratic knowledge about the client’s business and of interfaces software systems. 
In such projects, clients may still want to safeguard against vendor opportunism. As a result, the main 
effect may dominate over the interaction effect. This interpretation is in line with prior results in IS 
outsourcing studies, which also found insignificant interaction effects (Alaghehband et al. 2011, p. 
134). 
5.2 The Knowledge-based View and Multisourcing Decisions 
Our results demonstrate that the KBV helps explain variance in multisourcing decisions above and 
beyond what can be explained by incomplete contracting theory. Our study points to three mecha-
nisms of how knowledge-based issues affect multisourcing. First, we found that clients were more 
likely to choose multisourcing when they sought to access vendor knowledge through the outsourcing 
project (see our results on H6). Although our empirical measure did not focus on the variety of 
knowledge required in a project, this finding broadly echoes the prevailing view that multisourcing 
can help clients to access knowledge (Bapna et al. 2010). Second, we found that clients chose multi-
sourcing by far less frequently when projects relied on proprietary technology. When technology is 
proprietary, an important prerequisite for multisourcing is frequently not met: the availability of multi-
ple vendors that possess the knowledge that is most relevant for the project. Third, we found that cli-
ents were more inclined to choose multisourcing when they were experienced in IS outsourcing (see 
our results on H8). This finding empirically substantiates the position that multisourcing is complex 
and therefore requires considerable management capabilities from clients (Bapna et al. 2010). While 
this finding echoes the perspective that multisourcing requires strong architectural knowledge from 
clients (Brusoni et al. 2001), our results emphasize knowledge in managing outsourcing relationships, 
rather than architectural knowledge related to a particular software. 
5.3 Contributions 
Our study makes important contributions to the multisourcing literature and to the broader outsourcing 
discourse. Our contributions to the multisourcing literature are threefold. First, we develop a theoreti-
cal framework that helps organize themes that emerged from multisourcing research. While prior mul-
tisourcing research has rarely explicitly drawn on TCE, PRT, and the KBV (Bapna et al. 2010; Levina 
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and Su 2008; Wiener and Saunders 2014), we show how theoretical reasoning from these perspectives 
can enlighten our understanding of multisourcing. Second, to the best of our knowledge, our study is 
the first to provide empirical evidence about multisourcing decisions. Our comprehensive dataset al-
lowed us to empirically test relationships that would be difficult to test in smaller samples, given the 
nature of our dependent variable (dichotomous) and the relatively low probability for multisourcing. 
Third, while the existing multisourcing literatue emphasizes benefits and challenges of multisourcing, 
our study provides insights into the prerequisites that constrain multisourcing decisions in organiza-
tional realities. Specifically, we find that clients may struggle to leverage multisourcing when they rely 
on proprietary technology, when they conduct primarily small projects, and when they lack IS out-
sourcing experience. This suggests that multisourcing decisions are not only forward looking decisions 
in which clients anticipate opportunistic threats and knowledge needs; multisourcing decisions are also 
constrained by technology choices, IS budgets, and experience in managing IS outsourcing projects 
Our study also offers two contributions to the broader outsourcing literature. First, while empirical 
tests of TCE have often reported mixed findings (Alaghehband et al. 2011; Lacity et al. 2011), our 
study shows that TCE can well predict multisourcing if TCE is complemented by PRT and if the oper-
ationalization of knowledge specificity focuses on application knowledge. This reinforces calls to pay 
greater attention to the nature of application knowledge in IS outsourcing research (Krancher and 
Dibbern 2015). Second, while the existing outsourcing literature emphasizes the role of client-specific 
knowledge, our results points to the important role of knowledge associated with proprietary technolo-
gies. We show that proprietary technology make clients dependent on vendors and thereby constrain 
sourcing decisions. 
5.4 Limitations 
Although our study provides initial empirical insights into multisourcing decisions, the insights are 
associated with a set of caveats. First, our data stem from public procurement. Studies in other indus-
tries may show to what extent our findings apply to the private sector. Second, since we relied on ar-
chival data, our study offers limited insights into the mediating factors that link the constructs of our 
study with decisions. Surveys and case studies are thus likely to provide complementary insights. Such 
studies could also provide additional insights into the knowledge that clients require in multisourcing, 
into the types of knowledge that clients aim to access through multisoucing, and into the practices 
through which clients can effectively engender competition among vendors. Third, we studied multi-
sourcing decisions rather than performance. Yet, an important question is whether multisourcing is 
associated with performance benefits under particular circumstances. This is left to future research. 
Fourth, our measure of prior joint experience does not allow us to separate the trust effect from the 
knowledge effect associated with prior joint experience (Benaroch et al. 2016). This calls for more 
differentiated measures. Fifth, our project-level operationalization of multisourcing is relatively nar-
row. Clients may undertake a sequence of temporally overlapping projects and involve different ven-
dors in these projects. While such settings may also qualify as multisourcing, they are not grasped by 
our measure. We are currently coding projects to larger programs to enable such an analysis. 
5.5 Implications for Practice 
Our study provides a number of tentative implications for practice. Clients may consider multisourcing 
as a strategy to discourage vendor opportunism and to access valuable vendor knowledge. Multisourc-
ing may be an effective strategy to discourage opportunism, in particular when the software is client 
specific (i.e., custom-developped), when clients lack prior experience with the vendor, and when pro-
jects are large. Clients may also make deliberate attempts to tailor larger projects in order to make 
them amenable for multisourcing. However, clients should be aware that they may not be able to lev-
erage multisourcing under all conditions. Clients with little experience in managing IS outsourcing 
relationships may be advised to first gather experience in managing single-sourcing projects before 
they move on to multisourcing. Moreover, clients should be aware that their choice of technologies 
that are mastered by one or few vendors may constrain them in their ability to leverage multisourcing. 
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